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ABSTRACT 
The notion of controlling performance in modern healthcare constitutes a key justification for implementing large IT systems. 
By examining the relationship between healthcare performance and IS cost we significantly improve our understanding of 
healthcare delivery profile.  In the absence of an appropriate fit between the goals of IS projects and smooth healthcare 
delivery, this research satisfies information needs for healthcare decision-makers.  
Drawing upon contingency research the authors develop a framework to analyze fit between healthcare delivery strategies 
and IS focus. They review empirical evidence from the English National Health Service implementation of a nationwide 
healthcare system with functional and interpretive paradigms. The results not only suggest a monumental gap between the 
two and but also explains how attempts to control healthcare performance can easily lead to even higher costs. It also 
elaborates on current pragmatic thoughts about costing IS projects before outlining the research approach.   
Keywords 
Controlling Cost, Healthcare IS Project, Cost and Performance Fit. 
INTRODUCTION 
This study integrates costing economics and controlling theory to investigate how difference in the use of IS projects are 
associated with the reforming of healthcare performance. As the cost of healthcare escalates to unbearable amount, providers 
seek new business opportunities to enhance their competitiveness. Many providers focus on improving the agility of their 
delivery process (i.e., the speed at which patient concerns receive response, improvement in healthcare delivery process, and 
improvement in service providers’ efficiency), seeking to improve their services by utilizing advanced IT systems—though 
implementation often prove unnecessarily complex.  Without sound management and control of both the implementation 
process and the organizational changes, healthcare system implementation will continuously be a difficult and risky process 
(Currie & Guah, 2007; Davenport, 1998; O'Leary, 2000). 
The primary motivations in studying cost patterns at IS level include unresolved issues surrounding healthcare delivery 
budget allocations (Wanless, 2002), emergence of IT as a growing and integral component of business processes (Hendy et 
al, 2005), and the general frustration with escalating healthcare expenditure globally (Brennan, 2007; Cox & Dawe, 2002, 
Pollack, 2005; Porter & Teisberg, 2006).  Specifically, this study examines the measures being used to control costs of very 
large IS projects in the National Health Service of the UK.  The following broad research questions were developed: (i) What 
are the important costing issues when healthcare providers implement IS project?  (ii) How does the NP control project 
costing?  
The results complement existing knowledge from recent empirical research into healthcare IS and the role of IT expenditure 
(Guah & Currie, 2005; Mark, 2007; Pollack, 2005). Other studies identified factors that are critical to the success of IS 
implementations—including physician support, the implementation team, organisational-wide commitment to the system, 
and fit between the NP and the NHS (Brennan, 2007; Randell, 2007). It is vital to understand the controls that are critical for 
the success of the NP applications; and also how complementary control procedures can minimize business risk.  
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DEFINITION OF CONSTRUCTS 
This section builds theoretical propositions for costing pattern of healthcare institutions based on their entrepreneurial, 
administrative, and healthcare delivery problems. Healthcare institutions exist within a dynamic environment and offer 
critical services within an often very straight monitoring environment.  Pioneering work by Gordon and Miller (1976) 
suggests that in a dynamic environment, costing information should include more non-financial information and more 
forecasts. Regarding administrative problems involved with healthcare delivery process, solutions can be found in the use of 
broad-based IS with a low degree of innovative.  Boulianne (2007) found broad scope of costing information to have 
significantly more positive impact on organization performance for similar strategic-type layer.   
Control Theory 
Control theory, as formally developed, predicts that different control modes be used in a singular fashion, (i.e. they become 
substitutable based on the environment). In the IS implementation domain, control theory has provided much guidance 
complex systems implementation projects (Grasbski & Leech, 2007; Kirsch, 1997; Kirsch et al., 2002; Walsham, 2002). 
However, control theory has not been able to adequately explain why multiple control modes are used. An alternative 
approach is to view controls from the perspective of complementary theory, which allows for the integration and interaction 
of the various control and organizational modes (Orlikowski, 1991). 
Control is implemented and exercised through various mechanisms that result in the regulation of behavior and it can be 
implemented through formal and informal mechanisms (Kirsch, 1997: p.217). The formal modes of control are behavior and 
outcome (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007) and formal control mechanisms are generally associated with performance 
evaluation (Kirsch, 1997). The informal control methods are group (clan) control and self-control, and are based on social 
and people-related strategies (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). The informal control mechanisms allow the introduction of 
some type of self-regulation rather than the formal control mechanisms that are based on organizational and agency theories 
(Kirsch, 1997). 
When formal control mechanisms are used, the actions of the controlees are observed, and rewards are distributed based upon 
some evaluation rubric. In behavioral control, the rewards are based upon the match between the observed actions and the 
pre-specified allowed behavior (Kirsch et al., 2002). Behavioral control is appropriate when known behaviors and observable 
behaviors are present (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). The more controllers understand the systems development process 
and the more observable the project manager's steps, the more likely it is that controllers will use behavioral controls (Kirsch, 
1997). 
Outcome control does not focus on behavior; rather, the focus is on the accomplishment of a measurable goal, with reward 
distribution based upon the degree to which the goal was attained (Willcocks, & Lacity, 2006).  To ensure effectiveness, 
objectives must have been enumerated and outcomes must be observable and measurable (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; 
Kirsch, 1997). The more measurable the project outcomes, the more likely that pre-specified goals exist and that the controlee 
will be evaluated on these goals (Grasbski & Leech, 2007; Kirsch et al., 2002). With respect to an NP implementation, an 
incentive can be based upon meeting a go-live date, with some reduction (or elimination) of the bonus if the go-live date is 
missed, or missed by more than a specified period (Guah, 2008). 
Informal control mechanisms are based upon adherence to some type of group or individual norm. For example, clan control 
is based upon common values, beliefs, etc. within a group of individuals who share a set of common goals or are dependent 
upon each other. The group is able to disseminate the values, goals and objectives through a process of socialization and 
member selection (Orlikowski, 1991; Walsham, 2002). Acceptable behavior results from the socialization process.  
The Notion of Costing in Healthcare 
Existing literature on costing information provided to healthcare managers can be categorized into the following three layers: 
focus, quantification, and time horizon (IMA, 1995) 
• Focus layer emphasizes the extent to which information in healthcare systems focuses internally within the institution 
providing healthcare services.  This layer can also point to external factors relating to the healthcare provider environment 
• Quantification layer emphasizes both financial and non-financial information within the healthcare system affecting the 
healthcare delivery process.  
• Time horizon layer emphasizes historical details within the healthcare systems us to compare post information with current 
thus, facilitating future prediction. 
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These three characteristics can be seen in the scope of performance control construct in healthcare systems. Traditional 
performance controls are designed with limitations to financial implications internally to the healthcare provider sometimes 
offering an historical time horizon. IMA (1995) referred to this practice as a ‘narrow-scope’ that only consists of internal, 
financial, and historical information. They argued the need for a broader approach to performance control resulting to 
external, non-financial, and future-oriented information—in addition to internal–financial–historical information, a broad-
scope. 
DATA COLLECTION 
Our data collection process involved the assembling of a range of academic, government and industry studies on healthcare 
sector. These studies were not restricted to the UK only, but included articles and reports on healthcare services in many 
countries, regions and locations. Subsequent interviews focused on general topics (i.e. IT in healthcare, patient services, 
hospital management and professional best practice), with a limited number focused upon specific activities (i.e. the NP, the 
Wanless Report, and costs of NHS IT strategy). These interviews generated many useful research contacts later engaged for 
primary data collection.   
Initially, 100 institutions were contacted by telephone and emails, 60 agreed to participate in the study offering to have 5 
persons complete the questionnaires. Regular follow-up telephone calls (between 3 to 5 within the period of six weeks) were 
made to reinforce the importance of participation.  During such telephone calls, a series of telephone interviews were 
conducted. Questionnaire responses were received from 28 institutions, mostly via emails.  
Fifty open-ended and semi-structured interviews were conducted during the first four years of the NP project implementation 
(see Table 1).  Multiple informants were interviewed both within the NHS hospitals and with other constituents (see Table 1). 
During the first year of interviews, the scope of the study was extended, as it was important to elicit data and information 
from a wider range of respondents engaged in the implementation of the NP. These included, IT service firms bidding for 
public sector IT contracts and doctors in general practice (external to the NHS hospitals). Respondents from IT service firms 
offered critical insights into the political and procurement processes within the NHS and public sector more generally. GPs 
offered useful insights about the communication channels underpinning the NP. 
Cases ONE TWO THREE FOUR FIVE 
Type of Institution Local Health
Community 
 General Hospital Primary Care Trust Foundation Trust Primary Care 
Trust 
Classification PCT PCT PCT Foundation Trust PCT 
Cluster Midlands South North Midlands North 
Star Rating *** *** ** *** * 
No. of Staff >5,000 >7,500 >2,000 >5,000 >2,000 
Population Served 1,5000,000 500,000 146,000 553,000 91,000 
No. of Interviews 11 10 12 10 7 
Table 1: Five NHS Organisations 
PERFORMANCE CONTROLS SYSTEMS COSTING 
Table 2 shows that large elements of taxpayers’ funds are being spent to increase the NHS use of IT.  This expenditure also 
relieves the NHS of much of the cost of developing and implementing new systems. The total annual cost of IT to the NHS is 
around £3.4 billion—about 4% of 2006-07 total NHS’s budget of £84.4 billion.  Nonetheless, local NHS organizations 
continue to require more money to spend on IT for a number of purposes.  Local IT expenditure over the life of the NP may 
exceed Connecting for Health’s expenditure, increasing IT bills to £20 billion by 2013-14.  
Table 2 shows expenditure focusing mainly on the NP current contracts with suppliers and other Connecting for Health 
activities. As a result of the National Audit Office satisfaction with current budget management procedures, Connect for 
Health does not seek to maintain a detailed estimate of the overall cost of the NP (NAO, 2006). 
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Amounts Break-down Comments 
£84.4 billion  NHS annual expenditure for the year 2006-07 
£20 billion  Estimated NHS expenditure (including the NP) for 2004-2014. 
£1.5 billion  Expected maximum expenditure for the management of the NP over the ten-year 
period. 
£1.9 billion  Other central expenditure, primarily by Connecting for Health on centrally managed
projects and services within the NP, and running Connecting for Health 
   
£6,220 million  Initial contracts placed in 2003-04 and still being managed within this total.  
£382 million  
 
£245 
£88 
£49 
Amount for contracts and projects added to the scope of the NP, for separate business
cases, comprising:  
For central data stores required for Picture Archiving Communication Systems; 
To provide NHSmail – the e-mail and directory service for all NHS staff; 
For additional services in relation to NHSmail (such as the relay service and archive
facility).   
£239 million  
£69 
 
£80 
 
£90 
Additional services purchased beyond the scope of the original national core
contracts, comprising:   
To provide for extra capacity in connections for the New National Network (N3).  
To deliver additional services to Choose and Book to support the Department’s new
policy requirements such as Extended Choice.  
To support systems integration, for example to enable any suppliers providing IT in 
the NHS to test the integration of their software with the Spine.  
£12.4 billion  
 
£6.2 billion 
 
£382 million 
 
£239 million  
£1.9 billion 
 
£337 million 
 
£3.4 billion 
Total spending on the NP (at a gross level, i.e. without deduction for possible savings 
or benefits) of (at 2004-5 prices) over the ten-year life of the main contracts, to 2013-
14. 
By Connecting for Health on the fixed price contracts let in 2003 and 2004, in line
with the announcements made at the time of contract awards. These contracts are 
being managed within this total.  
Contracted expenditure on new projects added to the original scope of the NP,
predominantly PACS, where the cost of providing central data stores is £245 million. 
On additional services to be purchased beyond the scope of the original core contracts 
(a mixture of contracted expenditure and estimated costs).  
In other central expenditure, primarily by Connecting for Health on centrally
managed projects and services within the NP and running Connecting for Health, 
based on current estimates of likely expenditure. Connecting for Health told us that
on the current scope of the 
On the estimated cost of replacing core contracts that expire before the end of the ten
year period to 2013-14. This is a notional allowance to recognise that expenditure 
will be required to continue these services, but it is too early to make a more precise
estimate of their likely cost.  
In expenditure by local NHS organisations, for example on local IT and training and
ensuring compliance of local systems with NP delivered systems.  
£860 million  Estimated savings achieved through the ISP. 
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1,448 million  Expected expenditure of originally contracted services 
£654 million  Actual expenditure on the originally contracted services 
£49 million  Approximates annualised central costs of the NP 
£337 million  Extrapolation of the cost of the core contracts to cover the whole of the period to
2013-14. 
£50 – 500 million  Suppliers to pay Connecting for Health in the event of the supplier’s default 
(depending on the contract). 
Table 2: National Programme Costing  
Though all the figures in Table 2 are not based on contracts already signed, they represent provision to protect funding 
including the probability of an extension to the NP at a later date, thus permitting the inclusion of certain costs of all the IT 
services delivered by the Connecting for Health.  
Financial Risks 
With a ten-year (2004-2014) budget of £20 billion the NP is confident that suppliers have sufficient funding and resources to 
carry out all obligations under existing contracts.  Suppliers, however, may suffer a financial lost, because their contracts can 
be terminated without compensation in the event of contractor default.  The contracts not only include strong value for money 
mechanisms, but Connecting for Health has put in place mechanisms to help ensure continuing value for money over the life 
of the contracts (NOA, 2006). The pricing of changes is tightly controlled, suppliers are required to ensure the technology is 
continuously improved within the original contract value and refreshed so that systems continue to meet the changing needs 
of the NHS throughout the contract periods; service performance and costs can be benchmarked and suppliers’ prices reduced 
as a consequence; and Connecting for Health shares in any profits which exceed defined amounts. All of these mechanisms 
are underpinned by open book accounting.  
As well as transferring financial and delivery risk to its prime contractors, Connecting for Health has taken positive action to 
ensure the contractors are managing their tasks well. Such intrusive, but supportive, approach to supplier-management is not 
common in the public sector—an approach that covers both prime contractors, and several hundred subcontractors working 
on the NP. It allows for decisive action to be taken when a supplier does not deliver what was required.  Connecting for 
Health can take remedial action if suppliers are failing to deliver with such key safeguards as:  
• Connecting for Health can step in and manage the supply chain if and when required. 
• Connecting for Health can audit the performance of suppliers.  
• Specific software would be own by the NHS. 
• Terminated contractors have to assist in transferring service to new contractors. 
 
The NP Case Interpretation 
The decision to develop the NP was not only politically ambitious but also risky at both cultural and technical level. 
Healthcare is an information-rich business with 15% of hospital resources spent on gathering information. NHS doctors and 
nurses are estimated to spend up to 25% of their time collecting and using information (National Audit Office, 2004). NP was 
intended to extend the boundaries of the organizational field in healthcare by using a range of external service providers for 
its development and implementation. NP would have four key components: (i) electronic transfer of prescriptions; (ii) 
Choose & Book to enable GPs and patients to book medical appointments; (iii) a picture archiving system; and (iv) the NHS 
care records service. They are supported by an IT infrastructure to enable connectivity via broadband.  Currie and Guah 
(2007) outlined the technical framework of the NP and explained how each of the four main components would be achieved 
by signing long-term commercial contracts with large IT providers, many of whom have little knowledge and experience of 
the public sector, or more specifically, healthcare services. 
Table 3 demonstrates how the cost of maintaining NHS performance can be maintained at a constant level of about 1.2 per 
cent of GDP (Wanless, 2002). The NP case represents an embryonic stage in ascertaining the boundary conditions under 
which IS and related reform initiatives are more or less appropriate.  Brennan (2007) argues for a further case analyses of the 
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long delay (as well as the success) within the first six years of the project.  Until such research work is documented 
systematically, our ability to make specific predictions in particular healthcare provision context, must remain limited.   
 2002-03 2007-08 2012-13 2017-18 2022-23 
Total health spending (per cent of money GDP)  
Solid Progress 7.7 9.4 10.5 10.9 11.1 
Slow Uptake 7.7 9.5 11.0 11.9 12.5 
Fully Engaged 7.7 9.4 10.3 10.6 10.6 
Total NHS spending (£ billion, 2002-03 prices) 
Solid Progress 68 96 121 141 161 
Slow Uptake 68 97 127 155 184 
Fully Engaged 68 96 119 137 154 
Average Annual Real Growth in NHS Spending (per cent) 
Solid Progress 6.8 7.1 4.7 3.1 2.7 
Slow Uptake 6.8 7.3 5.6 4.0 3.5 
Fully Engaged 6.8 7.1 4.4 2.8 2.4 
Table 3: Projected NHS IS Spending  
In the solid progress scenario, UK health spending is projected to rise to 11.1 per cent of GDP by 2022-23 (see Table 3). But 
if, for example, productivity growth was to be 1 percentage point a year lower than assumed and nothing else changed, the 
equivalent spending figure would be 13.1 per cent of GDP. Conversely if productivity was to be 1 percentage point a year 
higher over 20 years, the percentage of GDP devoted to health care, all other things being equal, would be 9.4 per cent by 
2022-23—reform goes alongside additional investment.  Arguably, the budget increase can be interpreted as highly 
understandable ‘intimidation rituals’ (Cross, 2005), engineered in an effort to bring about centralized control and conformity 
in the face of divergent opinions regarding issues that are fundamental to the longer-term survival and well-being of the NHS.  
Given the pathological elements of the government’s controlling behavior, future research should rigorously investigate the 
purpose of designing intervention procedures that are more sensitive to the internal-context of healthcare institutions and, 
therefore, likely to prove more effective in terms of the IS intervention outcomes. 
There is clear evidence, from extensive field notes compiled during collected data, of a variety of dysfunctional processes at 
work, as depicted in Pollack (2005) conflict theory of decision-making and the literature on dynamic aspects of project 
champion (Constantinides & Barrett, 2006).  A content analysis of the interview transcripts strongly supported this particular 
theoretical interpretation of the events encountered.  Critical reflection by Guah (2008) came to the conclusion that 
confronting the social psychological reality of a cognitively disparate organization faced with an uncertain future proved 
ultimately too stressful for a number of service providers to bear and gave rise to a variety of dysfunctional coping strategies, 
including ‘bolstering’ commitment to the current, failing strategy, ‘procrastination’ and ‘shifting responsibility’ for the 
continuing adherence to the current strategy to another key service provider, exactly as would have been predicted a priori 
from Scott et al (2000) conflict theory of decision making.  
Prior to undertaking the project, NHS determined what its modernization processes and structure would look like (Wanless, 
2002). This change provided the outcome control to compare the planned and the actual transformed processes. Healthcare 
delivery reform can also be a behavioral control. Richard Granger—NP director 2002 to 2007—is being evaluated based 
upon the known and observable behaviors. Medical practitioners, also required to adapt the new processes, would be 
evaluated based upon their behavior and compliance to new procedures resulting from the NP. Connecting for Health has a 
set of shared values and naturally depends on other members of NHS team for the accomplishment of project outcomes. 
Support from the government and British Medical Association are informal controls designed to empower Connecting for 
Health and others involved in the NP implementation process. Such support can result in self-control since the behavior of 
medical practitioners can not been readily observable, partly due to the significant task complexity, and the unspecified or 
ambiguous rules for project completion—something Grabski and Leech (2007) called “antecedents for self control”. As the 
result of both government and BMA support for the project, Connecting for Health was empowered—a form of clan control.  
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On the other hand, if an active steering committee were in existence at the initial stage of the NP, a formal control would 
have resulted. The steering committee could have held Richard Granger and Connecting for Health accountable for the 
accomplishment of specific milestones at specific times and review whether these have occurred (Brennan, 2007; Currie and 
Guah, 2007). Such is an example of behavioral controls in addition to formal controls. An active steering committee could 
have also resulted in more observations of the behavior of Richard Granger, thus, demonstrating more controls over 
Connection for Health. 
CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS 
By attempting to reform healthcare delivery process in the UK, the NP implies outcome control, behavior control and clan 
control. Connecting for Health does not seek to maintain a detailed estimate of overall expenditure on the NP but makes 
broad projections of expenditure. Analysis of various financial projections indicates that provision had been made for total 
spending on the NP (at a gross level, i.e. without deduction for possible savings or benefits) of £12.4 billion over a ten-year 
period. 
The contracting of projects to independent service providers demonstrates that project management skills can result in 
behavior, outcome, clan and self-control. Richard Granger was able to break down a complex project into small manageable 
parts and associated deliverables against which Connecting for Health can be evaluated. Further, the project manager was 
able to observe the behaviors that are practiced and result in behavioral control. A knowledgeable project team resulted in 
clan control between Connecting for Health and the ISPs. Clan control results from the shared values and dependency of the 
group upon each group member. Clan control impacted the IT consultants as they adapted to the norms of the NHS. In a 
reflexive manner, the values, goals and objectives of the consultants did impact Connecting for Health. 
The negotiated contracts allowed for some £241 million to be paid to contractors in 2004-05.  As a result of delays in 
delivery of systems and following negotiation on contract change notices, £133 million was actually paid to contractors.  In 
transferring financial and delivery risk to its prime suppliers, Connecting for Health has made them responsible for finding 
alternative software suppliers if their original suppliers fail to deliver, but without increasing the price agreed with 
Connecting for Health.  
The present study has two main limitations. First, the sample used is limited to a single healthcare institution in one country.  
A larger sample would increase the statistical validity and add to the generalizability of results. Second, healthcare delivery 
process is a multi-dimensional construct and we covered only the financial perspective. Despite these limitations, this study 
makes a contribution by investigating worthy research work of costing and controlling large IT project.  It also established a 
relationship between controlling cost of IS implementation with performance, and a methodological contribution in using a 
multi-method, multiple respondent approach.  The authors have demonstrated that both efficiency and innovation in 
healthcare requires a dual monitoring process and various control mechanisms, making the management of healthcare reform 
more critical and problematic than previously documented in established literature. 
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